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Abstract The article examines whether and to what extent the level of a
buyer’s agent commission will affect the sale price of a house.
The estimation results suggest that a higher commission rate
leads to a higher sale price, although only for lower-priced
houses. It is suggested that, at least for this market segment, there
may be a principal-agent problem: buyer’s agents do not act in
the best interest of their clients because of the institutional
structure of sales commissions.
Introduction
Several studies have examined the relationship between agents and clients and the
effects on real estate prices and search duration of buyers (Janssen and Jobson,
1980; Jud, 1983; Jud and Frew, 1986; Zumpano, Elder and Baryla, 1996; and
Elder, Zumpano and Baryla, 1999, 2000). This study adds to this literature on the
interagency relationship between seller’s and buyer’s agents and the resultant
effects on real estate prices. More speciﬁcally, this study addresses the question
whether and to what extent a seller’s agent can procure a higher sale price for
his/her client’s property by offering a higher sales commission to the buyer’s
agent. The answer to this question may have far-reaching consequences for the
viability of the current principal-agent structure in real estate brokerage.
The study is organized as follows. The next section discusses the background of
the study. It is followed by a description of the data and the estimation results.
The ﬁnal section is the conclusion.
 Antecedents
In the larger and more sophisticated real estate markets, designated agency seems
to have become the preferred policy of real estate brokerage ﬁrms. This policy
allows the principal broker to designate certain agents as ‘‘seller’s agents’’ and
others as ‘‘buyer’s agents’’ while reserving the role as a ‘‘limited dual agent’’ to
the ﬁrm. The agent who lists a property for sale is designated as the seller’s agent
and all others, in or out of the ﬁrm, are considered buyer’s agents. This is a246  Zietz and Newsome
monumental change from the seller’s agency/sub-agency modus operandi that
existed for decades. Under the old system, the listing agency represented the seller
by explicit contract and all other agents, inside or outside the listing agency, were
sub-agents. This system, however, created confusion in that most buyers, and
perhaps most agents, thought that the agent showing the property to a prospective
buyer represented the buyer. The acts of the real estate agent accompanying the
buyer often established an implied agency relationship with the buyer and resulted
in an undisclosed, illegal dual agency. This illegal dual agency relationship was
rather commonplace until changes were mandated by the actions of consumer
advocacy groups such as the Consumer Federation of America, Ralph Nader and
others (Brobeck, 1994; and Jennings, 1998: 362–65).
Agency representation involves the duties owed to a client by an agent. A seller’s
agent represents the seller, exclusively, and must act in the best interest of the
seller. The duties owed to the seller include, but are not limited to, trying to obtain
the highest price for the seller’s property within the time span speciﬁed by the
seller. The duty owed to the buyer by the buyer’s agent includes trying to obtain
the property at the lowest price possible.1
Early disclosure of agency representation, therefore, is of utmost importance. The
buyer should be made aware that the seller’s agent is obligated to pass on to the
seller any information he/she can obtain that would put the seller in a superior
bargaining position. Buyer’s agents, in turn, must use the same diligence to obtain
information that would put the buyer in a superior bargaining position. The trend,
resulting from early disclosure requirements mandated by every state, is clearly
toward a ‘‘one agent-one client’’ mode of operation in real estate brokerage
wherein the seller and buyer are each represented by their own agent.
A typical scenario is that the listing agent negotiates a sales commission with the
seller and gets the seller’s permission to enlist the cooperation of other agents
(buyer’s agents) who are members of the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) and to
share the commission with such agents. The amount of the commission to be
shared with the buyer’s agent is usually 50% of the total commission but is at the
discretion of the listing (seller’s) agent. The commission amount to be paid to the
buyer’s agent is revealed through the MLS or other means of inter-agency
communication. Therefore, buyer’s agents know, prior to showing a property, the
amount of the commission associated with a particular property.
This situation begs an important question: Can a seller or his agent induce a higher
price for his/her property by offering the buyer’s agent a higher commission rate?
If a positive correlation does indeed exist between the buyer’s agent’s commission
and the sale price of a real estate property, one needs to raise the issue to what
extent buyer’s agents fulﬁl their obligations toward their clients, the buyers. Do
they try to help them ﬁnd a suitable house at the lowest price possible or do they
try to inﬂuence them, in various ways, to buy a possibly less suitable house at an
unnecessarily high price in order to receive a higher commission.2Buyer’s Agent Commission and Sale Price  247
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If the latter could be conﬁrmed, it may be necessary to reconsider the current
structure of real estate brokerage. In particular, one may have to consider the
following issues. Would it be to the advantage of the buyer to know if his/her
agent is receiving a higher commission rate for a particular house? Should real
estate agents be required to disclose their commission? If a buyer is going to use
a buyer’s agent, then should the seller’s agent incur the expenses of advertising
in public media? Alternatively, would he/she better serve his client by advertising
the property through low cost interagency communications and offering a greater
share of his commission as an incentive to a buyer’s agent? In sum, the question
whether and to what extent a higher buyer’s sales commission induces a higher
sale price has rather important implications for the institutional characteristics of
real estate brokerage.
 Data and Estimation Results
The study utilizes a data set of 592 house sales from the Orem (Utah) area for
the years 1990 through 1997. Basic statistics and variable deﬁnitions are provided
in Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 2 presents the results of estimating a number of alternative hedonic price
functions on the data set. For each regression, the sale price is regressed on typical
housing characteristics and the variable of particular interest in this study, the
commission received by the buyer’s agent (COMM). Model 1 uses the complete
data set of 592 observations. The coefﬁcient for COMM is statistically highly
signiﬁcant for this model. The coefﬁcient suggests that an increase by one
percentage point in the buyer’s agent commission raises the sale price by an
average of $3,708. The statistical ﬁt of Model 1 is relatively good as measured
by R2 and the highly signiﬁcant overall F-test. It is also reassuring that Ramsey’s
(1969) Reset test does not identify a problem with wrong functional form.
However, the estimated equation suffers from both heteroskedasticity, as identiﬁed
by the Breusch-Pagan (1979) test and non-normality in the residuals as identiﬁed
by the Jarque-Bera (1987) test. Ordinarily, heteroskedasticity and non-normality
in the residuals induce little response by the researcher other than the use of
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance estimator to
adjust the standard errors. However, this response may not be appropriate if
heteroskedasticity and non-normality are a sign of a deeper problem. The literature
on neglected heterogeneity (e.g., Hall, 1987) suggests that, for linear regression
models, the combination of heteroskedasticity and non-normality may indicate that
the data contain observations from various subgroups, each with a unique set of
regression coefﬁcients. In that case, the solution to heteroskedasticity and non-
normality does not lie in a simple transformation of the variance-covariance matrix
but rather in the estimation of separate regression equations for each of the
subgroups.
In practical applications, the question of how to identify homogeneous subgroups
arises. For the given data set and in the light of earlier evidence (Newsome and248  Zietz and Newsome










Sale price 151,013 100,900 224,900 122,812 166,366
COMM Commission paid to
buyer’s agent, in
percent
2.88 0 5 2.75 2.95
YEAR Year house was
built
1994.5 1990 1997 1994.9 1994.3
SQFT Square footage 2,386.7 955 4,400 1,755.6 2,726.7
BEDR Number of
bedrooms
3.5 0 6 3.1 3.7
BATHR Number of
bathrooms
2.4 1 7 2.0 2.6
STYLE1 Ram/Ran 0.419 0 1 0.415 0.419
STYLE2 Split level 0.034 0 1 0.063 0.018
STYLE3 Tri-level 0.042 0 1 0.083 0.018
STYLE4 Two-story 0.155 0 1 0.073 0.200
STYLE5 Other 0.014 0 1 0.024 0.008
COOL1 Central air
conditioning
0.412 0 1 0.283 0.482
COOL2 No air conditioning 0.316 0 1 0.429 0.253
COOL3 Window units 0.002 0 1 0 0.003
Notes: Model 1 is the full sample. Model 2 is the low price minus one. Model 4 is the high price.
Zietz, 1992) it appears useful to examine whether the impact of the buyer’s agent
commission varies by price. To identify subgroups by price, the data set is sorted
by price and on this sorted data set rolling regressions are run with 100
observations each. For each rolling regression, the beginning and the end of the
sub-sample of 100 observations are advanced by one observation each. The
regression coefﬁcients for the variable ‘buyer’s agent commission’ are then
compared across all rolling regressions. This method provides a fairly efﬁcient
way to locate changes in the regression coefﬁcient as one advances from low to
high housing prices. For the given data set, it points to a signiﬁcant change in the
coefﬁcient for COMM at a housing price of about $134,000.
Models 2 to 4 of Exhibit 2 detail the regression results when the data set is split
at a housing price of $134,000. Model 2 provides the results for housing prices
at or below $134,000; Model 3 is a subset of the observations used forBuyer’s Agent Commission and Sale Price  249
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Exhibit 2  Hedonic Price Regressions Explaining the Sale Price
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 326,211 335,425 363,195 364,879
(0.51) (0.64) (0.73) (0.46)
COMM 3,708.1 2,698.6 2,735.7 3,601.7
(3.15) (4.36) (4.40) (1.31)
YEAR 133.8 204.9 224.1 156.4
(0.41) (0.78) (0.90) (0.39)
SQFT 16.1 38.0 28.8 25.7
(3.28) (5.12) (3.94) (2.72)
SQFT*SQFT 0.003 0.008 0.006 0.001
(3.02) (3.96) (2.98) (0.42)
BEDR 3,197.5 202.6 211.5 3,207.0
(4.09) (0.24) (0.26) (3.62)
BATHR 5,768.0 1,279.5 995.1 5,083.1
(5.60) (1.54) (1.26) (3.85)
STYLE1 7,217.2 2,935.4 3,423.7 6,517.8
(4.99) (2.80) (3.41) (3.31)
STYLE2 550.3 1,451.0 2,256.7 9,430.85
(0.17) (0.81) (1.35) (1.69)
STYLE3 2,204.1 121.6 808.4 1,008.1
(0.74) (0.07) (0.53) (0.18)
STYLE4 5,000.1 3,234.6 4,149.7) 7,268.2
(2.58) (1.78) (2.44) (3.17)
STYLE5 4,085.0 6,279.9 4,421.6 16,370.5
(0.81) (2.20) (1.36) (1.98)
COOL1 4,517.2 75.0 128.4 5,846.1
(3.02) (0.07) (0.12) (3.05)
COOL2 288.2 1,232.1 1,304.2 2,673.3
(3.17) (1.10) (1.23) (1.16)
COOL3 29,227.1 0 0 30,469.8
(2.12) (2.15)
R2 0.7912 0.4595 0.3864 0.7079
Adj. R2 0.7862 0.4197 0.3387 0.6968
Probability values:
Overall F-test 0 0 0 0
BP Heteroskedasticity test 0 0.895 0.949 0.011
Jarque-Bera normality
test
0 0.075 0.256 0
Reset functional form test 0.972 0.192 0.166 0.266
Number of observations 592 205 195 384
Min. price in sample 100,900 100,900 108,000 134,000
Max. price in sample 224,000 134,000 134,000 224,000
Notes: Model 1 is the full sample. Model 2 is the low price version one. Model 3 is the low price
version two. Model 4 is the high price. The dependent variable is the sale price. T-values are reported
in parenthesis. See Exhibit 1 for variable deﬁnitions.250  Zietz and Newsome
Model 2;3 and Model 4 includes all observations for housing prices above
$134,000. It is apparent that the variable of interest in this study (COMM) remains
statistically signiﬁcant only for the lower price segment. The size of its coefﬁcient
is lower by a third relative to Model 1; yet, the coefﬁcient is statistically better
deﬁned. The coefﬁcients of COMM for Models 2 and 3 suggest that a one
percentage point increase in the buyer’s agent commission raises the sale price by
about $2,700. Model 4 reveals that, for houses above $134,000, a higher
commission for a buyer’s agent has no statistically signiﬁcant impact on housing
price.
It is noteworthy that the statistics on heteroskedasticity and normality of the
residuals improve markedly for Models 2 and 3. Neither of these models has any
apparent statistical ﬂaw. In comparing the estimated coefﬁcients for Models 2 and
4 to those of Model 1, one can ﬁnd sufﬁcient evidence for neglected parameter
heterogeneity in Model 1. Not only do the regression adequacy tests improve
relative to Model 1, the estimated coefﬁcients for Models 2 and 4 are also rather
different, not only in statistical signiﬁcance and size but for some variables (e.g.
STYLE5 and STYLE6) also in sign. There is another result that is typical for
neglected heterogeneity: numerous coefﬁcients of Model 1 are out of the range
that is estimated for the subsamples. In particular, the coefﬁcients for COMM,
BATHR, SQFT and SQFT2 in Model 1 are larger than any of the corresponding
coefﬁcients for the subsamples. This suggests that these coefﬁcients are biased
upward in Model 1.
Multicollinearity is an issue of common concern in hedonic price functions. The
equations reported in Exhibit 2 are not different in this respect. The condition
numbers for the equations reported in Exhibit 2 are typically above 4,000, which
suggests a very signiﬁcant amount of multicollinearity (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch,
1980). Fortunately, the multicollinearity issue does not arise for the variable
COMM, which is of primary concern in this study. The variance inﬂation factor
for this variable is less than 1.4 in all reported regressions.4 In fact, the variance
inﬂation factors are of concern only for the dummy variables identifying house
style (STYLE2-STYLE6) and type of cooling equipment (COOL2-COOL4).5 But
this clearly does not interfere with the basic message of the results reported in
Exhibit 2.
A ﬁnal point of some concern is the sensitivity of the results with respect to the
set of included variables. Although it is not feasible for the given data set to test
for the impact of additional variables, such as lot size or neighborhood effects, it
is easy to identify whether the elimination of regressor variables changes the
results in a material way. As a fairly extreme test whether COMM is sensitive to
variations in model speciﬁcation, all four equations reported in Exhibit 2 are rerun
with only a constant term and the variable COMM present. The results fully
conform to those of Exhibit 2 and their interpretation. In particular, the coefﬁcients
are estimated to be 9536, 2932, 2427 and 2023 for Models 1 through 4,
respectively. The coefﬁcients for Models 1 through 3 are highly signiﬁcant
statistically, similar to the corresponding coefﬁcients reported in Exhibit 2. TheBuyer’s Agent Commission and Sale Price  251
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fourth coefﬁcient, which relates to higher priced homes, is not signiﬁcantly
different from zero at any reasonable level of statistical signiﬁcance. One can
conclude that the material results reported in Exhibit 2 with respect to the buyer’s
agent variable COMM are insensitive to the variables considered in this study.
Since other potential regressors, such as lot size, are often correlated with at least
some of the variables that are included in this study, it appears likely that the
results are robust. However, given the importance of the subject matter, it would
clearly be interesting to check whether the results can be replicated for a larger
sample size, a larger set of regressor variables and alternative locations within the
United States.
 Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to identify whether and to what extent the
level of a buyer’s agent commission will affect the sale price of a house. In
contrast to the recent study by Elder, Zumpano and Baryla (2000) that identiﬁes
no association between sale price and buyer’s agent commission, the results of
this study suggest the existence of a positive association. On closer examination,
however, it turns out that there is a positive impact of a buyer’s agent commission
on sale price only for houses at the lower end of the market. For higher-priced
houses, there is no such effect.
The results suggest that the current structure of brokerage commissions may be
compromising the allegiance of a buyer’s agent to his/her client, although, it
appears, only for properties in the lower price range. The reasons for this
asymmetry are not immediately obvious but they should certainly be of interest
for anyone who is thinking about restructuring the commissions in real estate
brokerage in order to minimize the potential for principal-agent problems. One
may speculate that buyers of higher priced properties are more experienced in
dealing with real estate agents and are, therefore, more immune to their inﬂuences,
such as steering, pufﬁng, etc. Alternatively, it may be that a buyer’s agent will
only actively seek buyers for lower-priced properties when a minimum dollar
amount can be earned. The higher commission could provide for this minimum
and, therefore, get more buyer’s agents to show an interest in a property. The
increased interest for the property could, in turn, induce the seller or the seller’s
agent to resist low price offers.
 Endnotes
1 See a late edition of any popular Real Estate Principles textbook for a more complete
description of the duties owed to clients.
2 An interesting piece of the puzzle is the common pitch used by listing agents to offer a
higher commission if a full price is obtained on the sale. This seems to be a rather overt
intent to get buyer’s agents to disregard their obligations toward their clients.
3 Some observations are taken out at the very low end of the range of housing prices.252  Zietz and Newsome
4 A variance inﬂation factor of 10 or more is typically considered to be of concern (Belsley,
Kuh and Welsch, 1980).
5 The variance inﬂation factor for SQFT is above 10 only due to the presence of the non-
linear term SQFT*SQFT in the regression. However, the collinearity between SQFT and
its second power is irrelevant since the marginal contribution of SQFT on price is never
assessed separately from that of SQFT*SQFT. Rather, the two square-footage terms are
necessarily used together to calculate the contribution of square-footage to price.
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